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ture.8 9 Under the Act, the regulations are subject to judicial review
by the circuit court of appeals at the instance of any person who would
be adversely affected by such regulation in cases where an actual con-
troversy had arisen.90 In this court's review, any findings of the Sec-
retary as to facts, if supported by substantial evidence, is conclu-
sive.91 Previously, a party adversely affected by any regulation would
have had to depend upon the court's relief against such regulation
when it was sought to be enforced against him, in which event, as
part of the case, the regulation would be subject to the court's review.
Today, the judgment of the court, affirming or setting aside any order
of the Secretary, is final, subject only to review by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
92
The new Act, with the exception of a few minor provisions which
became effective on the date of its enactment, is to go into effect on




THE FEDERAL FIREARMS Ac.-The transition of crime from a
chiefly local problem to one of interstate and even international pro-
portion has been taking place since the World War. This gradual
change, necessarily resulting in a partial disability of local law en-
forcement, engendered the clamour for federal crime control. Ac-
cordingly, in 1933, the Senate directed the Committee on Commerce
to investigate the subjects of kidnapping, "racketeering", and other
forms of crime, and to recommend the necessary remedial legislation.1
To the layman it might seem that the only authority required for the
passage of such laws would be the police power but actually, the
United States Government is, in this respect, under the very burden-
some restraint of the Tenth Amendment 2 The national government
I Id. § 371 (a) (under subd. (e) the Secretary, upon his. own initiative or
upon the application of any interested industry, is to hold public hearings upon
any proposal to issue, amend or repeal any regulation, with certain exceptions
noted).IId. §371(f) (1).id. §371(f) (3).
MId. §371(f) (4).
'Id. §292(a). The sections of the Act authorizing the Secretary to
promulgate regulations for the new Act, are to go into effect immediately. This
will enable the Administration- to set the groundwork so that the Act may be put
into effect on June 25, 1939, with little disruption.
ISEN. REs. No. 74 (May 8, 1933, as amended June 12, 1933).
'U. S. CossT. Amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people").
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has no police power except that expressly or impliedly granted it by
the Constitution.3
The important powers through which Congress may try to curb
crime are the power to tax,4 the power over interstate and foreign
commerce,3 and the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers." 0 The
power to tax has been responsible for the control of narcotics 7 and
machine guns,8 while the power over interstate and foreign commerce
has resulted in the control over kidnapping,9 white slavery,10 stolen
motor vehicles," and opium for smoking purposes.12
Although it was common knowledge that many crimes occurred
through the use of dangerous and deadly weapons, such as pistols and
revolvers, control of these articles by the federal government was
hampered by the Second Amendment ' 3 and by various groups favor-
ing state control. Finally, the Committee on Commerce, through a
subcommittee headed by Senator Murphy of Iowa, Senator Vanden-
berg of Michigan, and the late Senator Copeland of New York, pro-
posed 14 the Federal Firearms Act 15 which met with the approval of
the National Rifle Association and the National Pistol Association 16
and which, as we shall see later herein, does not contravene the Second
Amendment.
I.
The Federal Firearms Act 17 became law with the approval of
President Roosevelf on June 30th, 1938. It went into effect on July
30th with the purpose of regulating interstate commerce in firearms
and consequently curbing the possession of such weapons by crim-
inals. The Act provides for the licensing of all manufacturers and
dealers in the interstate commerce of firearms. Criminals are banned
from either receiving or sending firearms in interstate or foreign com-
'United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875) ; New Orleans, etc., Co.
v. Louisiana, etc., Co., 115 U. S. 650, 6 Sup. Ct. 252 (1885); United States v.
L. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. 249 (1894) ; 12 C. J. 910.
'U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
'Id. cl. 3.
'Id. cl. 18.
144 STAT. 120 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1040 (1934).
'48 STAT. 1236, 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 1132-1132q (1934).
'47 STAT. 326 (1932), 18 U. S. C. A. § 408a (Supp. 1938).
" 36 STAT. 825 (1910), 18 U. S. C. A. §398 (1926).
" 41 STAT. 3Z4 (1919), 18 U. S. C. A. §408 (1926).
'35 STAT. 614 (1909), 21 U. S. C. A. § 173 (1926).
'U. S. CONST. Amend. II ("A well-regulated militia being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not
be infringed").
78 Coe. Rac. 448-460 (1934).
"52 STAT. 1250, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 901-909 (Supp. 1938).
"81 CoNG. REc. 1527 (1937).
"52 STAT. 1250, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 901-909 (Supp. 1938).
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merce. Stolen firearms and those with obliterated serial numbers are
barred from such commerce. The Act has nine sections but for pur-
poses of clarity and brevity shall be treated under three divisions:
definitions, prohibitions, and administration.
Definitions.
The terms "person", "interstate and foreign commerce", "manu-
facturer", "dealer" and "crime of violence", as defined '8 in the Act
do not necessitate discussion. A "firearm", by its definition, would
include all weapons such as pistols, revolvers, rifles, machine guns,
"sawed-off" shotguns, and tear gas guns. The term "ammunition"
specifically excludes .22-caliber rim-fire ammunition and impliedly ex-
cludes rifle and shotgun ammunition. This was done, no doubt, to
appease the various sportsmen's and hunters' groups and farmers.
The term "fugitive from justice" does not apply to one who has fled
to avoid prosecution for a crime other than a crime of violence, but
it does apply to one who has fled to avoid giving testimony in any
criminal proceeding even if the latter does not involve a crime of
violence.' 9
Prohibitions.
The prohibitions may be properly classified according to the par-
ticular group prohibited from doing the enumerated acts. There are
four groups: manufacturers or dealers, those under indictment for a
crime of violence, fugitives or those convicted of a crime of violence,
and the rather inclusive classification, "any person".
Manufacturer or dealer: This group is forbidden to ship, trans-
port, or receive, in interstate or foreign commerce, any firearm or
ammunition unless licensed to do so 20 and even if licensed, anyone
within the group cannot ship or transport any firearm to any person
SId. at 1250, § 901:
"(3) The term 'firearm! means any weapon*** which is designed to
expel a projectile or projectiles by the action of an explosive and a firearm
muffler or firearms silencer, or any part or parts of such weapon.
"(6) The term 'crime of violence' means murder, manslaughter, rape,
mayhem, kidnaping, burglary, housebreaking; assault with intent to kill, commit
rape, or rob; assault with a dangerous weapon, or assault with intent to commit
any offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.
"(7) The term 'fugitive from justice' means any person who has fled from
any State, Territory, the District of Columbia, or possession of the United
States to avoid prosecution for a crime of violence or to avoid giving testimony
in any criminal proceeding.
"(8) The term 'ammunition' shall include all pistol or revolver ammuni-
tion except .22-caliber rim-fire ammunition."
10 Ibid.
152 STAT. 1250, 15 U. S. C. A. § 902a (Supp. 1938).
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in any state which requires a license for the purchase of a firearm,
unless such license is exhibited to the manufacturer or dealer by the
prospective purchaser, or unless the purchaser is another dealer or
manufacturer licensed under the Act.21 The above sections do not
prohibit anyone not a dealer or manufacturer. Before the federal
government can get jurisdiction under the preceding provisions, it
must show that either the shipper or receiver is a manufacturer or
dealer and in such a case only the manufacturer or dealer is violating
the Act.
Those under indictment for a crime of violence: Under Section
902e of the Act, this group is forbidden to ship, transport, or cause
to be shipped or transported any firearm or ammunition in interstate
or foreign commerce.2 2 There are no express provisions against re-
ceiving firearms or ammunition in interstate commerce but it would
seem that if such an article is received by one in this group because
of an order placed in interstate commerce by such person, the clause,
"cause to be shipped or transported", is violated. Therefore, such
person may receive firearms or ammunition in interstate commerce
only when he did not solicit or order such article.
Fugitives or those convicted of a crime of violence: This group
is under the same prohibitions as the preceding group,2 3 and in addi-
tion, under Section 902f, may not receive any firearm or ammunition
in interstate or foreign commerce.2 4 In conjunction with the latter
provision, Congress has seen fit to add, " * * * and the possession
of a firearm or ammunition by any such person shall be presumptive
evidence that such firearm or ammunition was shipped or transport-
ed or received, as the case may be, by such person in violation of this
Act." 25 This presumption must necessarily apply only to Sections
902e and 902f for it is only under these sections that such person is
prohibited from shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or am-
munition. The presumption does not apply to Section 902f alone for
the provision expressly states "in violation of this Act" and further-
more, to hold that it applies only to Section 902f would be to render
the phrase "was shipped or transported" nugatory. For, if such per-
son has the article in his possession, he could not have shipped it,
although he might have transported it in interstate commerce, and in
the latter case he would not be guilty under Section 902f because the
crime thereunder is receiving in interstate or foreign commerce. There-
fore, in order to give full effect to the legislative intent, we must con-
tend that the presumption applies to Sections 902e and 902f.
Any person: No one is permitted, in interstate or foreign com-
merce, to receive any firearm or ammunition from an unlicensed dealer
' Id. § 902c.






or manufacturer if he knew or had reasonable cause to believe such
manufacturer or dealer to be unlicensed.20 One notes that this pro-
vision does not apply to transactions between individuals neither of
whom is a dealer or manufacturer.
Nobody is permitted to ship, transport, or cause to be shipped
or transported, in interstate or foreign commerce, any firearm or am-
munition to any person, knowing or having reasonable cause to be-
lieve that such person is a fugitive or is under indictment for, or was
convicted of a crime of violence.2 7  Further, there is a prohibition
against shipping, transporting, or causing to be shipped or transport-
ed, in interstate or foreign commerce, any stolen firearm or ammuni-
tion, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe such to have been
stolen.28 Nor may one deal in firearms which have been stolen from
interstate commerce, knowing such to have been stolen.2 9
Section 902i forbids the shipping, transporting, or knowingly re-
ceiving, in interstate or foreign commerce, of any firearm from which
the manufacturer's serial number has been removed, obliterated or
altered, "and the possession of any such firearm shall be presumptive
evidence that such firearm was transported, shipped, or received, as
the case may be, by the possessor in violation of this Act." 30 It is
clear that the presumption applies only to the instant subdivision for
only under this section is there any ban against such firearm.
Administration.
The Act is to be administered by the Secretary of the Treasury
who may prescribe necessary rules and regulations,3 1 and issue li-
censes to manufacturers and dealers.3 2  Within forty-eight hours
after conviction of a licensee for a violation under the Act, the clerk
of the court is to notify the Secretary of the Treasury who shall re-
voke such license, unless, upon appeal from such conviction, the li-
censee posts a $1,000 bond.3 3 The bond stays revocation pending the
appeal. Licensed dealers must maintain records of shipments, impor-
tations, and other disposal of firearms or ammunition. 34
-Id. § 902b.
Id. § 902d.
' Id. § 902g.
2 Id.-§ 902h ("It shall be unlawful for any person to receive, conceal, store,
barter, sell, or dispose of any firearm or ammunition or to pledge or accept as
security for a loan any firearm or ammunition moving in or which is a part of
interstate or foreign commerce, and which while so moving or constituting such
part has been stolen, knowing, or having reasoanble cause to believe the same
to be stolen").
52 STAT. 1250, 15 U. S. C. A. § 902i (Supp. 1938).
52 STAT. 1250, 15 U. S. C. A. § 907 (Supp. 1938).
12 Id. §§ 903a-903d (at least two years must elapse before a new license is
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The Act does not apply to the United States Government, nor
to any state government, nor to any municipality, nor to any com-
missioned officer or agent thereof.3 5 Banks, public carriers, express
or armored-truck companies, or research laboratories may be granted
exemptions. 3 6 Unserviceable firearms or ammunition held as curios
do not come within the Act.3 7
Anyone who knowingly makes a false statement in applying for a
license or exemption under the Act, shall, upon conviction, be liable
to a maximum fine of $2,000 or a maximum prison term of five years,
or both.38 A violator of any of the provisions is liable to the same
penalty.3 9
II.
Congress has the power to make all laws necessary for the regu-
lation of interstate and foreign commerce.40 The Federal Firearms
Act 41 is well within the scope of such authority, and it matters not
that the exercise of the power is attended by the same incidents that
are prevalent in the police powers of the states.42  Such legislation
has been consistently upheld as evidenced by the banning from inter-
state commerce of lottery tickets,43 adulterated and improperly labeled
food,44 opium for smoking purposes, 45 stolen motorcars, 46 prison-
made goods, 47 "white slaves", 48 and narcotics generally.49 Are fire-
arms less potentially dangerous or detrimental to the public welfare
than any of these? Is society put in a greater state of unrest by a
lottery ticket?
The Act may possibly be contested on the ground that it in-
fringes upon "the right to bear arms", 50 or that it violates the "equal





'See notes 5 and 6, supra.
"52 STAT. 1250, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 901-909 (Supp. 1938).
'Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U. S.) 1, 197 (1824) ; United States v.
Carolene Prod., 304 U. S. 144, 58 Sup. Ct. 778 (1938); Whitney, The Latest
Development of the Interstate Commerce Power (1903) 1 MIcH. L. REV. 615;
(1938) 13 ST. JOH N'S L. REv. 147.
, Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 321 (1902).
"Weeks v. United States, 245 U. S. 618, 38 Sup. Ct. 219 (1917).
'United States v. Yee Fing, 222 Fed. 154 (D. C. Mont. 1915).
"Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432, 45 Sup. Ct. 345 (1924).
' Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431, 56 Sup. Ct. 532 (1936).
"Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281 (1913).
"Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178, 45 Sup. Ct. 470 (1924).
' U. S. CONST. Amend. II.
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protection of the laws" clause,51 or that it violates the "due process"
clause.52
Right to bear arms: 53 The contention that the Act infringes
upon this right has been answered about fifty years ago when it was
held that "to regulate a conceded right is not necessarily to infringe
the same." 54 It would be absurd to hold that provisions requiring a
license infringe the right to keep arms.
Equal protection of the laws: Class legislation is unconstitu-
tional only when the classification is arbitrary and unreasonable. 55
It is clear that fugitives, those convicted of a crime of violence, and
those under indictment for such a crime, are the ones who are most
likely to use firearms to the detriment of all society. The classifica-
tion is certainly not arbitrary for it is based on general considera-
tions of prevailing conditions, and therefore does not unconstitution-
ally contravene the equal protection of the laws.
Due process of law: The latter parts of Sections 902f and 902i
are the controversial ones because they deal with statutory presump-
tions. The United States Supreme Court, in Mobile J. & R. C. R. R.
v. Turnipseed, 6 set down the rule in reference to such presumptions:
"That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence
of another may not constitute a denial of due process of law,
* * * it is only essential that there be some rational connec-
tion between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed,
and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall
not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate." 57
n There is no "equal protection" clause in the Bill of Rights but it has been
held that the constitutional guaranty of due process in the Fifth Amendment
implies the equal protection of the laws. Sims v. Rives, 84 F. (2d) 871 (App.
D. C. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 682, 56 Sup. Ct. 960 (1936).
'U. S. CoxsT. Amend. V.
12 SToRY, CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1851) § 1897 (The enormous expense of
maintaining a standing army and the fear of having rights disregarded by
unscrupulous rulers gave rise to the right to bear arms). McKenna, The Right
to Keep and Bear Arms (1928) 13 MARQ. L. REv. 138, 149 (Today, in view of
the well-regulated militia and of the comparative absence of having "raw levies
* * * turn out overnight, * * * it is conceivable that the courts may well restrict
the right *-* * exclusively to the militia").
. State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367, 372, 14 S. E. 9, 11 (1891) ("Thus, a
prohibition against passing any law abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press would scarcely be so construed as to prohibit all statutes defining and
punishing slander or criminal libel; and the inhibition against passing any law
restricting the free exercise of religion would not prevent the passage of an act
prohibiting immorality when practiced as a religious tenet").
'Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 19 Sup. Ct. 281 (1898); Old
Dearborn, etc. v. Seagrams-Dist., 299 U. S. 183, 57 Sup. Ct. 139 (1936) ; Gunn
v. Minneapolis, etc., Ry., 34 N. D. 418, 158 N. W. 1004 (1916).
' 219 U. S. 35, 31 Sup. Ct. 136 (1910).
17 Id. at 43.
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A recent authoritative article 58 sets forth a working definition:
" * * * the fact out of which the presumption flows should be
relevant to the crime charged, * * * should be an ingredient
of the crime charged, * * * and should be one which experi-
ence has demonstrated to be closely connected with the estab-
lishment of the crime as distinguished from evidence of the
crime." 59
In view of these attributes it is submitted that the presumptions in
the Federal Firearms Act cannot be held constitutional. It does not
seem logical to hold that possession of a firearm with an obliterated
serial number evidences the fact that the possessor knowingly received
the gun in that condition in interstate commerce. The reasonable
man would presume that the possessor was the one who obliterated
the serial number. Section 902f presumes that the possession of a
firearm or ammunition by a criminal evidences the fact that such arti-
cle was shipped, transported, or received by the criminal from an-
other state. Considering outside factors,60 it is submitted that the
presumptions in Sections 902f and 902i are unreasonable, and there-
fore, unconstitutional.
There is a similar presumption in the Narcotics Act.61 Posses-
sion of narcotics or opium for smoking purposes is presumptive of
illegal importation by the possessor. 62 This artificiality has been up-
held because the courts have taken judicial notice that narcotics are
not domestic commercial products. 63
It would seem that the constitutionality of these presumptions will
not be determined for a long time. Federal agents may possibly use
the presumptions as an excuse to hunt down criminals, and if state
lines have not really been crossed, "release" the captured criminal
into the arms of the state authorities, rather than make the Act stand
the constitutionality test. In this respect, the Federal Firearms Act
is analogous to the Lindbergh Act.6 4 In the latter there is a pre-
' O'Toole, Artificial Presumptions in the Crimninal Law (1937) 11 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 167.
"Id. at 187.
178 CONG. REC. 456 (1934) (There are fifteen to twenty million guns in
the United States. These firearms are not centralized in one locality, nor are
all manufacturers located in one community).
'n48 STAT. 1236, 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 1132-1132q (1934).
138 STAT. 275 (1914), 21 U. S. C. A. §§ 174, 181 (1928).
'United States v. Yee Fing, 222 Fed. 154 (D. C. Mont. 1915). The law
of artificial presumptions has been fully discussed in the following articles
which cite sufficient cases: O'Toole, loc. cit. smpra note 58; Brosman, The Statu-
tory Presumption (1931) 5 TULANE L. REV. 178; Keeton, Statutory Presump-
tions-Their Constitutionality and Legal Effect (1931) 10 TEX. L. REv. 34;
Lane, Presumptions (1923) 22 MIcH. L. REv. 207; Morgan, Some Observations
Concerning Presumptions (1931) 44 HARV. L. Rav. 906; Note (1930) 43 HARv.
L. RE:v. 100; Legis. (1935) 10 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 169.
6448 STAT. 781 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. §408a (Supp. 1938).
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sumption that three days after a kidnapping, the victim, if he has not
as yet reappeared, has been transported beyond the boundaries of the
state.65 This presumption enables the federal agents to arrive on the
scene of a kidnapping before the clues disappear. Its constitution-
ality has never been determined because the facts in each case under
the statute showed an actual interstate transportation,66 and it is set-
tled that constitutional questions are treated in the aspect presented
by the facts of the particular case, rather than by facts which might
exist in other cases. 67
Even if the presumptions in this Act are declared unconstitu-
tional, the Act, as a whole, will not be affected, for it is the general
rule that if the valid part of a statute is separable from the invalid
part, the valid part will be sustained. 68
III.
In the aggregate, the Federal Firearms Act is sensible and de-
sirable. The individual states may aid the national government com-
bat crime by passing legislation making it mandatory to obtain a
license for the purchase or possession of a firearm. By this method
most transactions between individuals and dealers would come within
the purview of Section 902c.69
Section 902c would be more comprehensive if the term "licensed
manufacturer and dealer" were changed to read "person". The amend-
ed 902c would read: "It shall be unlawful for any person to trans-
port or ship any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce to any.
person other than a licensed dealer or manufacturer in any state the
laws of which require that a license be obtained for the purchase of
such firearm, unless such license is exhibited to such person by the
prospective purchaser." The Section so amended would cover trans-
actions between individuals neither of whom is a dealer or manufac-
turer, and also transactions now covered by the Section as it is at
present.
Federal legislation providing for a nominal yearly tax or a nomi-
0Ibid.
Ca Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, 56 Sup. Ct. 395 (1935) ; Bailey
v. United States, 74 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934) ; Kelly v. United States,
76 F. (2d) 847 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935) ; Seadlund v. United States, 97 F. (2d)
742 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) ; United States v. Parker, 23 F. Supp. 880 (D. C. N. J.
1938) ; United States v. Powell, 24 F. Supp. 160 (E. D. Tenn. 1938).
6 Copperthwaite v. United States, 37 Fed. 846 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930).
'Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 6 Sup. Ct. 850 (1886) ; Supervisors of
Albany v. Stanley, 12 Fed. 82 (N. D. N. Y. 1882); Dundee Mortgage, etc., Co.
v. School Dist. No. 1, 21 Fed. 151 (D. C. Ore. 1884); 52 STAT. 1252, 15 U. S.
C. A. § 908 (Supp. 1938) (furthermore the Act itself provides that should "any
section or subsection * * * be declared unconstitutional, the remaining portion
of the chapter shall remain in full force and effect").
1 52 STAT. 1250, 15 U. S. C. A. § 902c (Supp. 1938).
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nal transfer tax on firearms may possibly be effective, not as a crime
deterrent, but as a means to enable states, requiring licenses for the
possession of firearms, to enforce their licensing provisions. The fed-
eral authorities could give the names and addresses of firearms tax-
payers to the state authorities. It is logical to suppose that crim-
inals possessing guns would not register and pay the nominal tax;
but then, because of the tax, the federal government would have juris-
diction and might concurrently help the state capture the criminal.
As a further step to federal crime control, it would be very ex-
pedient to have the United States Constitution amended to forbid the
carrying of concealed deadly weapons. In view of the fact that fif-
teen states have no constitutional provisions for the bearing of arms
and therefore can pass such legislation,70 and at least twenty-nine other
states have upheld statutes forbidding the carrying of concealed
weapons or concealed deadly weapons, 71 there is every indication that
such a proposed amendment would attract the required two-thirds
of the state legislatures.
ALFRED M. AsCIONE.
SAVINGS BANK LIFE INSURANCE.-The legislatures of the sev-
eral states have long realized that the public has a vital interest in the
conduct and affairs of the numerous life insurance companies. By
stringent state regulation many abuses deemed inimical to this public
interest have been eliminated. Supervision alone, however, has proven
ineffectual in certain instances, particularly in the field of industrial'
insurance 1 where the sale by private companies has been marked by
high cost, high-pressure salesmanship by solicitors and excessive num-
ber of lapses. 2
o California, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington,
and Wyoming (the missing states are Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island, and
Vermont).
1 VANCE, LAW OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 38. "Industrial insurance is
the name applied to that kind of life insurance which is procured by working
men usually engaged in industrial enterprises. It is peculiar in that it is usually
granted in small amounts without medical examination and primarily intended
to provide proper care for the insured during his last sickness and after his
death." The newspapers frequently use "burial insurance" as a synonym for
industrial insurance.
'Louis D. Brandeis, Wage Earners' Life Insurance, Collier's Weekly, Sept.
15, 1906. "The sacrifice incident to the present industrial insurance system
could be avoided only by providing an institution for insurance which would
I VOL. 13
